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About this series 
 
 
The purpose of the project Public Private Partnerships and the Poor in Water and 
Sanitation is to determine workable processes whereby the needs of the poor are 
promoted in strategies which encourage public-private partnerships (PPP) in the 
provision of water supply and sanitation services. One of the key objectives is to fill 
some of the gaps which exist in evidence-based reporting of the facts and issues 
around the impacts of PPP on poor consumers. This series of reports present the 
interim findings and case studies of an analysis of both the pre-contract and 
operational phases of a number of PPP contracts. A broad view of PPPs has been 
taken and situations where the public sector is in partnership either with formal 
private sector companies, or with small scale local entrepreneurs, or with NGOs 
employed in a private sector capacity have been included. 
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1. 
 
Report  overview 
 
1.1 Statement 
This report has examined a number of projects and drawn upon the experience of key 
players associated with PSP in the water sector.  We have identified some recurring 
themes in relation to provision of services to the poor.  We do not attribute findings to 
any specific project and highlight the shortcomings not as criticisms, but in the 
interests of sharing of knowledge and improving services to the poor in the long run. 
 
1.2 Overview 
In this report we assess the effects on the poor of PSP in the water and sanitation 
sector.  We examine the key stages in the procurement process, detail the approach 
typically used by professional advisers involved in managing the transaction, and 
identify some unintended consequences which appear to impact upon services to 
poorer communities. We discuss the advisers’ ability to accommodate pro-poor issues 
in their work and we highlight the compounding effect of tight timescales, unreliable 
information, legal constraints and political sensitivity which can seriously limit the 
reach of the PSP arrangements in relation to supplying the poor. 
 
We reason that the greatest opportunity for accommodating pro-poor issues is at the 
planning stage and that process constraints, essentially competitively selected and 
contract-orientated advisers and operators, can restrict the resulting inputs and outputs 
of the key players. This in turn can limit their ability to properly address issues 
relevant to the poor.  
 
We have examined several projects and noted some recurring themes including 
insufficient understanding, research, planning and priority being given to pro-poor 
issues.  These can result in deficient outline contract specifications which become 
progressively more concrete as the process develops. When this is coupled with 
highly competitive (and occasionally opaque) procurement, in which hard-nosed 
competitors vie for lucrative long-term contracts, the result can be a questionable 
commitment to providing services to the poor.  Although both advisers and operators 
can differentiate their bids by offering to provide additional services to the poor, we 
find that improvement over the minimum specified requirements rarely occurs due to 
the highly competitive nature of the bid processes and the prize of success and losses 
to be anticipated if the poor are supplied at less than cost. 
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We have found that PSP arrangements commonly operate under a heavily regulated 
“command and control” relationship rather than a de-regulated “business for profit” 
arrangement in which market forces work to satisfy demand.  This means that the 
parties can too frequently engage in a servant and master relationship rather than as 
true partners sharing a common goal.  Whilst intended to protect the poor from 
profiteering, badly designed regulation or confrontational contract terms may in fact 
contribute to the reluctance of the private sector to serve the poor. 
 
A typical PSP contractual framework invariably, at some stage during its life, has 
conflicts and confrontations between operator and employer, with contentious issues 
often surrounding base levels of service, unforeseeable conditions and material 
changes in circumstances.  Operating companies have more experience and can draw 
on wider resources than regulators. This marked imbalance of commercial and 
negotiating skills can result in an asymmetric relationship between operator and 
regulator, resulting in tedious and time-consuming regulatory wrangles and a hiatus in 
service delivery. This relationship hampers an early resolution of any underlying core 
deficiencies or the early improvement of services to the poor.  
 
We have contrasted mechanisms for supplying water with those for consumer goods 
and other network services in which poor communities are better served. We conclude 
that market mechanisms can go a long way towards meeting demand in an 
unregulated market. These market mechanisms are essentially absent from most water 
sector PSP arrangements which are usually monopolies, which therefore tend to be 
highly regulated by the public sector, and grant exclusivity to the private sector.  
   
It is becoming more widely appreciated that secondary suppliers can play a useful role 
in opening-up the market for water services, thereby simulating market mechanisms 
particularly for serving poorer communities. We see opportunities for harnessing 
these mechanisms under the PSP umbrella, as long as they are truly embedded and 
developed throughout the PSP process. However, we find that time and capacity 
constraints can militate against such an approach. We suggest that a degree of 
liberalisation within the regulated framework could facilitate the provision of water 
services to the poor, although this would require increased confidence in the economic 
effectiveness of secondary suppliers and their ability to meet appropriate standards. 
 
We have prepared a simple gap analysis that presents the key steps in the typical PSP 
process and have contrasted these with a process that includes pro-poor strategies.  
We have identified that although additional time and resources would be needed to 
address the needs of the poor, these are small in comparison with the total cost of 
PSP.  
 
As part of the PSP process, and with good intentions, advisers and planners consider 
in some detail the complex inter-relationship between investment, service standards 
and tariffs in order to achieve a sustainable operation.  There is a danger, within the 
harsh competitive environment that these paper-based intentions can become divorced 
from reality and cannot realistically be achieved - the full extent of this 
unachievability only becoming apparent several years after the PSP arrangements are 
contracted. When cast in stone this can further fuel confrontation between the parties. 
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2. 
 
Introduction 
 
This report describes how PSP projects are prepared, and lists principal activities, 
constraints and the sequencing of events.  We have drawn also upon the authors 
extensive knowledge and wide experience of PSP processes, but found it difficult to 
source significant amounts of specific procurement-stage project information 
containing definitive requirements to target improved services to the poor. 
 
We draw the reader’s attention to Section 1.1. The views expressed are without 
prejudice to any of the named parties. 
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3. 
 
Preparation of PSP contracts 
 
3.1 PSP Strategy Stage 
The procurement of PSP arrangements mostly follows a ‘Phase I stage’ that develops 
the PSP strategy and the overall direction of the water sector re-structuring exercise.  
It is followed by a ‘Phase II stage’ that produces the actual contract bid documents.  
The issues involved in the strategy stage were described in ‘Private Sector 
Participation and the Poor: 1 – Strategy’ in April 2000 and this report starts from the 
time when governments have decided to embark upon Phase II and prepare PSP bid 
documents. 
 
The importance of ensuring that the Phase I strategy is right cannot be over-stated, as 
a failure to understand key legislative, financial and service performance requirements 
and expectations will be difficult and costly to overcome in Phase II.  Key political 
support and commitment will also be required to manage a smooth transition from 
Phase I recommendations to the start of Phase II work. 
 
The ability to influence the PSP process to specifically promote and improve 
services to poorer communities often lies within the scope of Phase I strategy 
work and becomes more difficult to achieve in the later stages of the PSP 
procurement process. 
 
3.2 Selection of Advisers 
Advisers will be appointed following a competitive bid process that may involve four 
or five competing firms.  With evaluation and selection of winning bids on a 
combined technical and financial score, it is unlikely that a pro-poor focus in the 
Terms of Reference and monitoring system, would outweigh other technical and 
financial factors.  Hence pro-poor strategies do not figure largely in the selection of 
advisers. 
 
Work generally proceeds in accordance with the prescribed Terms of Reference and 
the adviser’s proposal, and it is unusual for advisers to re-negotiate these.   
 
Water sector restructuring consultancy work requires financial, legal and technical 
expertise, and it is therefore normal for a consortium of firms, working under a single 
lead firm, to unite to undertake such assignments.  A consultancy team normally 
includes broad groupings comprising project management, financial analysis, project 
finance, water supply, institutional / regulation, and legal / contractual experts. Given 
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the expense of such large team structures, it can be difficult including additional 
NGOs and other pro-poor representatives within the team, unless specifically defined 
within the Terms of Reference. 
 
The requirement for best value often translates into the cheapest price for the advisory 
services, which may not pay sufficient attention to pro-poor strategies.  This also 
implies that the entire process starts from a point of minimum required input. 
The inclusion of expert staff who have PSP experience and a workable knowledge of 
how to improve water and sanitation facilities for low-cost areas is clearly important 
for ‘pro-poor strategies’ to be successful, but the availability of such staff is often very 
limited. 
 
3.3 Timescale for Advisory Commissions 
The time period allowed for Phase II study work and the preparation of bid 
documents is normally defined by the client to fit within narrow windows of suitable 
political climates, and can be as little as three months in duration.  Timescales are 
therefore short in relation to the spectrum of work to be undertaken, and do not allow 
for full due diligence and execution of the proper processes. 
 
Tight time constraints inevitably lead to advisers prioritising their workload, and 
consequently it cannot be guaranteed that worthy causes and needs are covered 
to the same degree of detail as the core technical/financial issues.  The ‘time 
factor’ may therefore be a significant reason for the historic under-
representation of services to low-income communities in many concession 
contract documents. 
 
3.4 Source Information for planning the PSP arrangement 
Phase I reviews on PSP strategy will have established key information and 
requirements, but fuller detail and greater accuracy is required for the implementation 
stage.  Every PSP project has a wide and often unique range of data requirements, 
which ideally will include: 
 
Legal & Regulatory Information 
Requirements 
Technical Information Requirements 
 Constitutional issues 
Primary legislation 
 Powers of the client agencies 
 Rights to award concessions 
 Constitution of client agencies and 
  shareholders’ agreements 
 Regulatory powers and structures 
 Ownership of assets 
 Labour laws / Trade Union issues 
 Rights of access 
 Rights to disconnect 
 Water Rights 
 Powers of tariff setting 
 Arbitration 
 National policies 
 Stakeholder information 
 Assessment of engineering andfinancial 
  data 
 Existing Service Areas and existingLevels of 
 Service  
 Water consumption characteristics 
 Water resources and water treatment 
 assets 
 Assessment of main planning and 
 environmental drivers for future 
 performance 
 Assessment of the condition, available 
 and required operational capacity of existing 
 assets to achieve (1) current  
 objectives (2) planning objectives and 
 (3) environmental objectives 
 Assessment of the effect of asset 
 performance on operational efficiency, 
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Legal & Regulatory Information 
Requirements 
Technical Information Requirements 
 and vice versa. 
 Staff numbers and conditions 
 Existing improvement programmes 
 Outstanding debts 
 
In reality, only scant information is usually available.  When coupled to a tight 
timescale and constrained inputs this seriously harms the completion of the full 
assessment process.   
 
The poor particularly suffer from “information deficits”  (ie. the gap between 
what is known and what needs to be understood).  Good knowledge with readily 
available information about low-income areas before the start of the PSP process 
is a critical factor. 
 
Funding agency requirements, their role and participation in the PSP process all need 
to be clarified by advisers, and sufficient time must also be allowed for receipt of 
comments from all donors. 
 
The responsiveness of funding agencies is an important part of PSP 
procurement, especially in emerging economies.  Funding Agencies are 
sometimes seen as being too distant during the PSP process, which can only 
hamper their ability to promote a pro-poor policy. 
 
3.5 Legal and Regulatory Drafting 
Legal drafting work will concentrate on supporting the PSP procurement process and 
work will centre on: 
 
 the drafting of amendments to primary legislation to enable PSP to be implemented 
 the preparation of foundation texts and bye-laws for new asset leasing company (if 
such options are applicable) 
 the preparation of draft ordinances as necessary to implement the desired PSP 
option 
 establishment of a regulatory framework and body 
 
Time, quality and cost constraints at the critical planning stage preclude the 
opportunity for a wholesale re-drafting of primary legislation related to the water and 
sanitation sector.  This would also distract from the fundamental goal of only 
accomplishing the minimal changes in order to support the PSP initiative. 
 
Furthermore, any focus on peripheral issues (such as duty of care, obligations for 
universal supply, exclusivity of supply, legality of tenure etc.) risks these issues 
coming to the surface and side-tracking the PSP implementation process.  Could this 
be the reason they are often left untouched? 
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3.6 Operators Selection Process 
The process of selecting a PSP operator starts with bid documents containing outline 
requirements, follows with formal offer documents from the bidders and concludes 
with an acceptance agreement. 
 
3.6.1 Operator Selection – bid documents 
The purpose of bid documents is to allow potential bidders to detail their offers to a 
prescribed format that allows for proper comparison.  The preparation (and 
administration) of bidding procedures is critical to ensure a transparent process that 
engenders confidence in the bidding operators that their significant investment in 
bidding will be made on a “level playing field”. 
 
The assessments of technical and financial offers are conducted in a mechanistic 
fashion against a list of pre-declared parameters.  The experience of nominated staff is 
examined with technical proposals, and these are assessed using weighting systems 
(see below). 
 
Table 1 – Technical Evaluation Weighting System 
(Typical for a concession contract in an emerging economy country) 
 
Technical Area 
under 
consideration  
Aspects of operation / Contract Percentage 
weighting applied 
to each item 
(Typical range) 
Strategy to 
reduce 
unaccounted for 
water  
Bidders must detail their approach to the reduction of 
physical water losses from the distribution system and 
the non-physical losses associated with incomplete 
billing records, illegal users etc 
15-25 % 
Strategy to 
Achieve Levels of 
Service 
Bidders must describe typical service improvements 
which centre on: (1) identifying constraints and 
improving the level of continuous supply; (2) 
broadening the effective use of metering; and (3) 
meeting supply pressure standards. 
15-25 % 
Asset 
Management 
Strategy 
The approach to maintaining and developing the 
assets (covering new construction procurement, 
addressing growth and expansion, asset maintenance 
and renewal, and optimising capital and operational 
expenditure) need to be defined.  
10 - 20 % 
Strategy for 
Promoting Local 
involvement 
Bidder’s approach to long term local partnerships, 
ownership and customer consultations need to be 
defined 
10 - 20 % 
Strategy to 
improve water 
services to Peri-
Urban areas 
The strategy for peri-urban areas covering the 
management/rehabilitation/maintenance of 
standpipes, a reduction in the mark-ups to the retail 
price of water and any other work to meet National 
water policies needs to be defined. 
10 – 16 % 
Human Resources 
Strategy 
Approach to employment terms and conditions, and 
local training 
10 – 14 % 
 Total = 100 % 
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A simple way of promoting low-income areas is by assigning a greater 
percentage weighting within the technical evaluation.  However, this detracts 
from other technical areas, and consequently may only have a marginal impact. 
 
3.6.2 Draft contract 
The bid documents include a draft Contract that sets out the contractual, legal and 
regulation regime under which the PSP operator will work.  Major elements include: 
 
 risk identification, management, mitigation and sharing 
 services to be provided by the operator, and obligations of the lessor 
 service standards, and technical and financial auditing of performance during the 
contracts 
 the regulatory process, criteria for modification of the tariff, and indexation 
 “trigger” arrangements for increasing the scope of the services, or extending the 
stake or risks of the private investor 
 the basis for and methods of payments 
 closure or termination arrangements 
 
There is a belief that the draft contract is only an initial framework to start 
proceedings and will be refined in negotiations towards the end of the 
procurement process. However, given the harsh commercial realities of bidding 
for competitive commissions this rarely happens and there is little material 
change in final service delivery requirements when compared to that set out in 
the draft contract. Any changes to contracts should be identified by bidders as 
conditionalities and should be evaluated in monitoring.  
 
3.6.3 Business Modelling of Investments and Tariffs 
Central within the bid documents are the minimum service targets and their 
maximum timescale for achievement. These will normally be predetermined by 
government but the Adviser is expected to assess whether they are achievable or 
whether they would be detrimental to the bidding process. Expectations are balanced 
against charges through a process of business modelling of levels of service, costs and 
charges as shown below. 
 
Business modelling of the long-term future of service delivery depends on both 
operational and financial parameters.  On the operational side, service outputs drive 
capital and operating expenditure, and the critical modelling parameters are the 
efficiency with which these can be delivered. Critical financial inputs are the cost and 
terms of borrowing, the availability of equity, and affordability 
 
High-level historic data is modelled to “balance” costs of operational / investment / 
service level improvement / charges, and then interpreted from that output into an 
appropriate form as contractual requirements. 
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The financial modelling balances the broad cost estimates of 
refurbishment/expansion/provision of new services, against income allowing for 
water operations in low-income communities. 
 
 
The scarcity of information, and occasionally understanding, can make it difficult to 
properly include the informal sector within the financial modelling exercise. The 
degree of services provided by operators in secondary markets should be assessed. 
 
It is also at this stage that political weighting or financial subsidies could be 
added to permit a greater degree of expansion in services to the poor. 
 
3.6.4 Service Standards – Formal and Informal Sectors 
Service targets are the standards of service that should usually be achieved for a 
specified population of consumers by prescribed dates.  For the formal sector these 
can be confidently stated.  However,  a full appreciation of how the informal sector 
operates is needed to state corresponding standards for the informal sector.   
 
Not only is there an absence of guidance for specifying service standards for the 
informal sector, but there can also be a reluctance by advisers and governments 
to regularise such standards in the informal sector due to their quasi-legal 
nature. 
 
3.6.5 Typical Service Standards in Emerging Economies 
Considerable effort is rightly placed on defining service standards and this is heavily 
linked to financial modelling.  There is a wide range of operational service standards 
which are typically grouped as: 
 
1. Mandatory standards governed by legal obligations arising from national or 
international law, notably water quality and environmental standards 
Figure 3.1 Business modelling of realistic expectations
Service Outputs from in ye a r to in ye a r
W a te r
Total connections No.
Dom estic  sales Mm 3/yr
Other sales Mm 3/yr
Population connected %  res ident population 63 1 95 10
Illegal connections %  res ident population 7.12 1 0.96 10
W ater consumption %  overall demand 68 1 97 10
Phys ical losses %  production volum e 38 1 25 12
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2. Technical and operational standards relating to serviceability as perceived by 
customers, with particular reference to availability and continuity of water supplies 
and Operational & Maintenance standards such as asset renewal, leakage or 
capacity enhancement. 
3. Customer service standards relating to efficiency of customer and revenue 
management processes. 
In most emerging economies the universality of service standards is not an economic 
possibility, and whether officially recognised or not, supply areas generally receive 
different levels of services.  PSP bid documents define levels of services by the 
facilities provided. A typical range of service classes is shown below: 
 
Table 2 - Levels of Water and Sanitation Services 
(Typical for service classes  in an emerging economy country) 
 
Level of 
Service 
Service 
Provided 
Water Supply Sanitation 
L5 Full Service 
(High Use) 
Metered connection for in-house 
supply (high use). 
Full waterborne sanitation. 
Each dwelling connected to 
sewer with full facilities 
available. 
L4 Full Service 
level 
Metered connection for in-house 
supply. 
Full waterborne sanitation. 
Each dwelling connected to 
sewer with full facilities 
available.  
L3 Medium 
Service level 
Metered standpipe per site. Toilet with superstructure 
and washbasin connected to 
waterborne system.  
L2 Low Service 
level 
One metered standpipe within 
100m of a household or low 
volume yard connection 
VIP latrine 
L1 Minimum 
Service level 
One metered standpipe within 
200m of a house or Communal 
Tank 
VIP latrine 
L0 Emergency 
and  
Temporary 
Settlement 
Service levels 
Temporary storage tanks  
with communal taps, or metered 
standpipes or Water Tankers 
One chemical toilet or shared 
VIP to be provided for every 7 
dwellings or shared ablution 
blocks 
 
Tender documentation for operator selection, identifies current standards and details 
future standards and the timescales for their achievement.  However good such an 
arrangement for procuring services is, there is a danger that it becomes a “paper 
exercise” with little correlation to present standards or those realistically achievable 
by the targeted dates.  The true reality of this gap only becomes apparent some time 
after the PSP arrangement is contracted. 
 
It is evident that water sector PSP arrangements can be highly detailed with 
many differing service requirements, payment schedules and penalty provisions.  
It can therefore rely upon extensive regulatory regimes with  “command and 
control” contractual provisions that contrast markedly with other services that 
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have found growth by adding economic value (and economic self-interest) into 
their business mentality. 
 
3.6.6 Service Targets 
Conventional definitions of minimum service targets to the formal sector include: 
 
 the quality of service currently provided in respect of key parameters (base service) 
 the desired target levels of service as percentage compliance against declared 
standards (service targets) 
 timetables for achieving targets and for dealing with inequalities in service 
(programmes). 
 
Such minimum service targets and maximum timescales may be bettered.   
In the harsh competitive environment (where there are no rewards for second place) 
bidders will offer the minimum requirement, especially when there is limited 
information on offer. 
 
3.7 Contracting the Operators 
 
3.7.1 Bidding, Evaluation and Acceptance  
Operators may choose varying tactics when structuring their bids. It is possible that 
long concession contracts will be seen as a series of shorter-duration contracts, and in 
the knowledge that there will inevitably be variations and re-basing of prices, bidders 
may choose to submit a reduced price in order to win the “first short contract”.  There 
may also be strong “market entry” factors for some concession contracts as Operators 
vie for a foothold in new regions. 
 
Offer documents will be scrutinised for compliance with  the requirements of the bid 
documents and undergo evaluations in accordance with published award criteria.  
Advisers will prepare an evaluation report that contains  recommendations for award 
of the PSP contract. 
 
A series of negotiations with the successful bidder may take place to confirm 
proposals and resolve outstanding issues.  The procurement process is completed with 
financial closure and award of contract. 
 
Host countries may have differing legal and cultural approaches to procuring 
services and the processes of bidding, assessment and award can vary. Financial 
issues such as financing of investments can dominate this part of the 
procurement process. As a result enhancing services to the poor can have low 
priority at this point.      
 
3.7.2 Local Company 
It can be politically and commercially advantageous to require International Operators 
to create a local operating company for the execution of PSP contracts.   However a 
risk remains that parent companies distance  themselves from the daily operations on 
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the ground, and that responsibility is lost as their “brand” becomes obscured under a 
local operating company name. 
 
Whilst governments may be under the impression that the PSP Operator will be an 
international company, in reality it can be locally established company  managing 
water services. Parent Company Guarantees and Performance Bonds should be 
included in the contract 
 
It is important to ensure that, in selecting and translating a competitively-
selected international operator to a local representation, commitments to deliver 
service obligations prescribed at the bidding stage are maintained. 
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4. 
 
Comparison with Other Sectors 
 
We consider that a brief comparison of how other services and products access the 
poor and see the poor as customers might contain valuable lessons for water PSP 
arrangements. 
 
Utilities that could be considered include: 
 
 electricity 
 mobile telephones 
High demand for these services exists and is met by new supplies.  These utility 
services benefit from having developed workable pre-pay metering devices and 
tariffs that are expressly linked to usage.  Initial connection charges are lower than 
for water services.  Operators generally have cheaper infrastructure and lower 
distribution costs.  Government involvement is high, but regulation less obtrusive. 
Typical consumer products where there is ample market penetration in poorer areas 
include: 
 
 cigarettes  
 soda drinks 
 baby milk powder  
Supply-side characteristics of these products include ample supply (both in terms 
of volume of goods and numbers of vendors/outlets), affordability of the wholesale 
goods, low start-up costs for sellers and low distribution/management costs, legal 
status and locality. 
 
Demand-side characteristics include desirability, longevity of product image (i.e. 
brand image), wide understanding of the benefits brought by the product, overall 
affordability, legal status and locality.  These products have an abundance of 
secondary sellers that stand alongside (often immediately outside) larger retailers 
with little or no conflict.  There is little government involvement. 
 
Different market mechanisms exist, but a pattern of openness, ample supply-side 
characteristics, affordability, legal status and locality exist. 
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Unanswered questions for water are how to replicate the low costs, accessibility, 
desirability and legality of the products and services briefly illustrated, and we 
suggest that further lines of enquiry are required. 
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5. 
 
Gap Analysis 
 
The transition from a public to private water sector is a continuum process separated 
by key events. It can be represented by a number of discrete stages, grouped into the 
following three broad steps: 
 
 Step 1 – Planning and Consensus of type, scale and scope of PSP 
 Step 2 – Procurement and Implementation of PSP 
 Step 3 – Operation, Regulation and Termination (or renegotiation) 
 
5.1 Additional Activities 
This process is shown on Figure 5.1, but if pro-poor strategies are to be added then 
additional resources are needed to resolve constraining issues.  These additional pro-
poor activities are also shown below and include more specific Terms of Reference, a 
clear strategy towards the inclusion of capacity building of the informal sector and the 
development of flexible but targeted contracts. Importantly, pro-poor strategy 
activities overlie all three broad steps and hence delivery of pro-poor services must be 
designed from 
18 
 
5.2 Additional Resources 
The resource implications of addressing the supplementary pro-poor issues are 
highlighted below in relation to resources required for the full PSP process.  They are 
shown to be small in comparison with the total cost and duration of PSP. 
 
Stage Task Additional 
Time 
Cost 
Implication 
Running 
Time 
(Years) 
Selection of 
Advisers 
More specific Terms of Reference Minimal Low 1 
Preparation 
of Bid 
Documents 
 Better information on the poor 
 Further diligence by Advisers 
Medium Low 2 
Bidding 
Stage 
Further diligence by Bidders Medium Medium 2 ½ 
Award Stage Additional commitment to pro-
poor policies 
Minimal Low 3 
Delivery 
stage 
Commitment to deliver 
Capacity building of informal 
sector 
Medium Low up to 30 
years 
 
Develop
Policy,
Investigate
Options
Select PSP
Model
PSP Bid
Document
Preparation
Offer and
Contract
Award
O&M of
Existing
Systems
Extend,
Improve
Services
Renegotiate
or
Terminate
Figure 5.1 - Gap Analysis
EXISTING PSP PROCESS
STEP 1 - Strategy STEP 2 - Implementation STEP 3 - Operation and Regulation
FUTURE “PRO-POOR PSP” PROCESS
• Clear government policy towards
the poor
• more specific Terms of
Reference
• Up-front information campaigns
for the poor
• Resolution of land tenure issues
•Additional Diligence by Advisers
•Inclusion of secondary markets
within PSP procurement process
• Flexibility of contract terms
• Clear pro-poor targets for
commercial Operator to achieve
• Security of staff
• Stakeholder participation
• Flexibility in levels of services /operating
standards
• Capacity building for informal sector
Additional Activities Additional ActivitiesAdditional Activities
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6. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have identified some recurring themes in relation to provision of services to the 
poor.  Shortcomings are not detailed as criticisms, but discussed in the interest of 
sharing of knowledge and improving services to the poor in the long run.  In 
examining the relationship between key stages in the procurement of water and 
sanitation PSP contracts and the effects on the poor we have found: 
 
 the selection of advisers can translate best value into most economically 
advantageous bid, which implies that the entire process starts from a point of 
minimum required input. 
 scant information coupled to a tight timescale and constrained inputs can harm the 
completion of the full assessment process, particularly for the poor. 
 time, quality and cost constraints can preclude whole-scale re-drafting of primary 
legislation related to the water and sanitation sector.  Focus on peripheral issues 
(ie. legality of land tenure) can risk delaying the PSP implementation process. 
 the commercial realities of service delivery through a commercial contract often 
mean that there is little incentive for enhancing service standards in comparison 
with those set out in the contract. 
 the harsh commercial realities of bidding in a competitive environment can mean 
that bidders rarely offer improvements over the minimum requirement. 
 water sector PSP arrangements often rely upon “command and control” contractual 
provisions that contrast with other services which appear to grow by adding 
economic value (and economic self-interest) into their business mentality. 
 the resource implications of addressing supplementary pro-poor issues are 
considered to be small in comparison with the total cost and duration of PSP. 
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